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Abstract 
 
Despite widely held views on fiscal adjustment as a political minefield for incumbents, the 
empirical literature on the issue has been surprisingly inconclusive. A crucial variable that 
has been often overlooked in the debate is partisan politics. Building on the micro-logic of 
Albert Hirschman’s “exit, voice and loyalty” framework, this article offers a novel theoretical 
perspective on the conditioning impact of partisanship in the electoral arena. Due to their 
more limited exit options at their disposal, left-wing voters are less likely to inflict electoral 
punishment on their parties, offering the latter an electoral advantage over their right-wing 
rivals. Relying on the largest cross-national dataset to date on the evolution of close to 100 
parties’ popularity rating in 21 democracies, time-series-cross-section results confirm this 
electoral advantage.  
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The Electoral Advantage of the Left in Times 
of Fiscal Adjustment  
 
 
Introduction 
 
As advanced industrial economies are emerging from the Great Recession and 
the ensuing sovereign debt crisis that afflicted a great number of countries in 
the Eurozone and beyond, the political economy of fiscal adjustment is back in 
the limelight of the scholarly community and popular discourse alike. Earlier 
episodes of fiscal adjustment in OECD countries, mostly occurring in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, had triggered a large body of research that sought to resolve a 
number of relevant issues surrounding the political logic of austerity. One 
particular theme that widely resonates through these accounts is that fiscal 
adjustment inherently carries political risks for the main actors involved in the 
game. In particular, governing parties that decide to tighten the purse under 
fiscal stress are unlikely to receive standing ovation by the electorate when the 
electoral verdict is due.  
 
Pessimistic accounts on the political consequences of fiscal adjustment chime 
in well with a wide array of different literatures that implicitly share a 
common view on voters. Political budget cycle theory (See de Haan and 
Klomp, 2013 for a more recent and Shi and Svenson, 2003 for an earlier review 
article of this voluminous literature) posits that voters favor expansionary 
policies prompting governments to relax the purse before elections and 
consolidate afterwards, if necessary. Economic voting (See Duch, 2007; 
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Hellwig, 2010; Lewis-Back and Paldam, 2000 and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 
2000 for excellent reviews), in turn holds that voters’ main leverage over their 
elected governments is the ability to hold them accountable for the economic 
climate they create. If fiscal tightening dampens economic activity via its 
standard Keynesian channels1, economic voting promises little solace for 
governments that engage in balancing the books.  
 
Theoretically, there are further reasons to expect fiscal adjustment to carry 
such electoral risks. One powerful reason has been provided by welfare state 
research with its more narrow and fine-grained focus on the single largest item 
of government finances: social expenditure. Since Paul Pierson’s seminal 
contribution (1994), welfare state scholars’ main theoretical premise has been 
an electorate that is closely wedded to the post-war welfare settlement. Both 
because of voters’ ideological and value-based attachment to major welfare 
programs (Boeri et al, 2001; Larsen, 2008; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; von Oorschot, 
2000) and because of the concentrated losses on large segments of welfare 
recipients that large fiscal adjustment efforts inevitably entail (Pierson, 1996), 
retrenching the welfare state has been seen as an electoral minefield where 
only clever blame avoidance strategies can potentially prevail (Weaver, 1986; 
Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2013). 
 
Such scholarly consensus on the dire electoral repercussions of fiscal 
adjustment masks a more complex empirical reality, however. As my review of 
the relevant empirical literature will show below, governments have survived 
and occasionally benefited from adjustment policies. This article’s main 
contribution is a novel perspective on why this has been the case. In particular, 
I will apply Albert Hirschman’s loyalty, exit and voice framework (1970) to                                                         1 See Monastiriotis (2014) for a recent review on the debate on the Keynesian vs. non-Keynesian effects of austerity. 
Abel Bojar 
3  
argue that the partisan color of governments is crucial to understand the 
electoral consequences of austerity. Relying on the largest cross-national 
dataset to my knowledge on political parties’ popularity ratings, I will then 
empirically show that while right-wing governments are in fact losing support 
in times of fiscal adjustment, no such empirical regularity is found for their 
left-wing rivals. 
 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section II offers a brief review of the 
literature on the political economy of fiscal adjustment and presents the 
theoretical framework of this article. Section III discusses the data and 
variables that I use for this study. Section IV outlines my empirical strategy 
and presents the main findings. Section V runs a number of robustness checks 
to probe the validity of the results. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
The (not so) Unpopular Nature of Fiscal Adjustment 
 
Literature Review 
 
As a wave of fiscal adjustment efforts swept through advanced industrial 
economies in the 1980s and 1990s, scholarly interest in their political 
consequences gathered steam. The underlying premise at the time was the 
inherently unpopular nature of fiscal adjustment (Eslava, 2011). As the number 
of successful fiscal adjustment episodes – defined by the duration and 
sustainability of debt reduction efforts (Alesina and Perotti, 1995) – increased, 
a more systematic empirical literature emerged that asked two different, but 
conceptually related questions. First, what factors are responsible for the 
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political commitment that sustained debt reductions efforts require? Second, 
do governments get systematically punished for tight fiscal policies in general 
and fiscal adjustments in particular? 
 
The first question prompted empirical studies to probe the determinants of the 
duration and persistence of fiscal adjustment efforts. Initiated by Alesina and 
Perotti’s study (1995), a series of other contributions (Alesina and Perotti, 1997, 
Illera and Mulas-Granados, 2008, Perotti, 1999, Tavares, 2004) followed up to 
investigate the reasons for the rich empirical arsenal of sustained adjustment 
efforts. If adjustment is as politically costly as received wisdom suggests, 
governments should turn their back from such policy at the first opportunity 
afforded by markets and/or institutional creditors. Beyond macroeconomic 
variables such as the size of the debt level (Mulas-Granados, 2006:3), political 
variables such as government fragmentation (Illera and Mulas Granados, 2008) 
and the electoral timetable (Alesina, 2006), the main line of argument largely 
converged around the notion of credibility. Since the main goal of fiscal 
adjustment is to signal commitment to financial markets, investors and 
consumers, duration can be understood as a commitment device: “the success 
of a fiscal adjustment depends crucially on its credibility, i.e., how permanent 
the initial change in the deficit is perceived to be” (Tavares, 2004 p. 249). 
Accordingly, Tavares (2004) has shown that when left-wing governments cut 
expenditure and right-wing governments increase taxes – which presumably 
run contrary to their political preferences – adjustments tend to last longer. 
Moreover, regardless of partisanship, Alesina et al (1998), Alesina and 
Ardagna (2009), Alesina et al (2011) and von Hagen et al (2002) argue that for 
adjustments to be credible and hence durable, they have to concentrate on the 
expenditures that are “politically most sensitive such as transfers subsidies and 
wage expenditures” (von Hagen et al, 2002 p. 513). Indeed, according to these 
empirical studies, those adjustments that concentrate on these budgetary items 
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have an increased probability to succeed and permanently reduce the public 
debt burden. 
 
The notion of credibility ties back to the highly contentious “expansionary 
austerity thesis” initiated by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). As the argument 
goes, credible adjustments lower the expected future tax burden and hence 
result in lower credit risk premia, higher current investment and consumption 
by the private sector and ultimately an economic boom. Although such 
credibility effects have been documented in a number of case studies such as 
Ireland and Denmark (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina et al, 1998) and 
through an explicit analysis of the evolution of risk premia during adjustment 
periods (Ardagna, 2009), the “expansionary austerity thesis” fell out of fashion 
after a series of rebukes by Devries et al (2011), Perotti (2011) and perhaps most 
prominently by Krugman (2010). The main thrust of these critiques revolved 
around the (mis)-specification of austerity periods – I will expand on this 
debate in the next section – and the failure to acknowledge the idiosyncratic 
nature (an export-boom facilitated by economic openness, exchange rate 
behavior, the response by monetary authorities etc.) of some of the success 
stories. 
 
If the alleged expansionary effects of fiscal adjustment are in fact not borne out 
by historical data, the high frequency of sustained adjustment efforts is all the 
more striking. If they do not deliver the immediate economic benefits, the 
direct burden of austerity on society is politically compounded by the 
detrimental effects via economic voting discussed earlier. These expectations 
have led scholars to turn towards the second important question on the 
political economy of austerity: do governments get systematically punished by 
their electorates when they adjust?  
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Empirical studies on the electoral consequences of fiscal adjustment, however 
have failed to confirm the widely expected punishment effect. The landmark 
study of Alesina at al (1998) finds no negative effects of adjustment periods on 
various measures of government termination. Blochliger et al. (2012) find in 
their sample of OECD countries that more than half of the governments that 
implemented adjustment were re-elected and some have continued their 
adjustment efforts afterwards. Alesina et al (2011) present similar findings and 
refute the very plausible objection on the grounds of reverse causality: 
perhaps, strong governments that have little to fear systematically initiate 
more adjustment episodes. By taking into account “government strength” in 
their empirical models, the authors show that this is not the case.2  
 
In addition to the exclusive focus on adjustment periods by the studies cited 
above other scholars have looked at the aggregate electoral response to overall 
changes in the fiscal stance. The findings that emerge from this related strand 
of literature largely conform to these previous results. Brender and Drazen 
(2008) argue and demonstrate that the electorate at large is “fiscally 
conservative” as it systematically punishes high deficits. In her review on the 
political economy of fiscal deficits, Eslava (2011) discusses a number of 
country-level findings (Brender (2003) for Israel, Peltzman (1992) for the US, 
Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Columbia) that point in a similar direction. The 
counterintuitive result that emerges from these studies is that contrary to the 
main premises of political budget cycle theory, voters do not reward 
expansionary policies at the polls.  
 
One possible way to reconcile these empirical findings with the opposite 
theoretical expectations is zooming in program-specific policy initiatives and                                                         2For a contrary view, Mulas-Granados (2006:7) presents statistical evidence for electoral punishment in the wake of adjustment periods. 
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their electoral consequences. Voters may have a conservative attitude towards 
public borrowing overall but are still willing to defend public programs 
through organized interests or at the polls. The historical relationship between 
popular protest and austerity documented by Ponticelli and Vogth (2011) 
suggests that it indeed may be the case: while they may recognize the overall 
need for balancing the books, voters are ready to participate in collective action 
to defend their program-specific interests. This is confirmed by a recent 
examination of Greek popular protest in the country’s recent struggle with 
austerity that finds that an astonishing 29% of respondents participated in 
strikes or demonstrations in the year of 2010 alone (Rudig and Karyotis, 2014).  
 
When considering election outcomes in the wake of welfare retrenchment 
efforts, however, the results are considerably less conclusive. In a landmark 
study on this question, Giger (2010) shows only very limited impact of social 
policy retrenchment on election outcomes. Wenzelburger (2014) contends that 
the lack of electoral punishment can be partly explained by taking into account 
blame avoidance strategies that governments use to diffuse the issue in the 
campaign. It remains debatable, however whether blame avoidance strategies 
can be so systematically and effectively employed that they shelter 
governments from electoral punishment across space and time.  Other studies 
further this debate in a promising direction from the standpoint of this article 
by highlighting that the partisan identity of parties that initiate adjustments 
matters. While parties with a positive welfare image tend to be punished after 
welfare retrenchment, traditionally more hostile parties towards the welfare 
state are not (Schumacher et al, 2013). Moreover, according to Giger and 
Nelson’s (2011) findings, some parties – liberal and religious parties in 
particular – are even rewarded at the polls after social policy retrenchment. 
Quite opposite to what the blame avoidance literature leads one to expect, 
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these parties are pro-actively claiming credit for their ability to implement 
successful retrenchment. 
 
While the notion that the traditional supporters of public services and social 
programs have more to fear from austerity sounds intuitive, it sits uneasily 
with a relatively recent turn in welfare state scholarship. Cukierman and 
Tomassi (1998) formally model a policy-making context where credibility 
advantage on a given issue domains translates into a policy-position contrary 
to where the party traditionally stood. Such Nixon-goes-to-China policy 
dynamics are brought closer to our domain of interest by Levy (1999), Ross 
(2000) and Kitschelt (2001) who show that in contemporary welfare reforms, it 
was often progressive left-wing governments who found it electorally more 
palatable to cut popular programs. 
 
This article contends that such Nixon-in-China patterns of policy-making are 
key to bridge the gap between the inconsistencies and often contradictory 
empirical findings of different literatures highlighted by this brief review 
above. In particular, for a more fine-grained theorization of the micro-logic 
that guides electoral choice, I turn to Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty (EVL) framework to set up the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
Theory: Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
 
Albert Hirschman’s classic work (1970) on the behavior of the individuals 
facing a decline in product quality has been applied for various political 
contexts by generations of political scientists. In its simplest form, a consumer 
dissatisfied with a product has three choices: 1) Exit, ie. abandon the product 
for one that is perceived as superior; 2) Signal her dissatisfaction to the 
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producer by voicing discontent; 3) Remain loyal and hope for change. In 
political settings, as Dowding et al’s review (2000) on the relevant literature 
argues, these options are not always straightforward to interpret. In repressive 
regimes, for instance, voice can be interpreted as collective action in 
demonstrations, or trying to change the regime from within by participating in 
its formal institutions (e.g. via party membership in the formerly communist 
one-party states). Exit, in turn, in its milder form could mean withdrawal from 
public life and in the extreme, emigration (“voting with one’s feet”). 
 
In the electoral arena, the choices are equally, if not more tricky to pin down. 
In a recent formulation of the EVL framework, Weber (2011) argues that 
protest voting in second-order election is a form of voice; the voter is not ready 
to abandon her preferred party, but signals discontent by choosing a different 
party in an electoral context that is perceived to be of secondary importance3. 
In contemporary parliamentary democracies, more direct forms of voice, 
however, are extremely hard to express. With the “cartelization” of parties 
(Katz and Mair, 2009) and dwindling memberships (Biezen and Poguntke, 
2014), an individual’s access to decision-making in political parties is 
extremely limited. Participation in mass protests, in turn, is hindered by 
collective action problems (Olson, 1965; 1982) and the low expected likelihood 
of collective voice to bring about policy change. 
 
Electoral exit is comparatively straightforward. Voting abstention is one 
obvious form of exit. It can result from alienation whereby a voter feels that 
parties have too little to offer to make it worthwhile for her to vote, or 
indifference whereby her preferred policy is equidistant from the competing 
parties’ electoral platforms (Brody and Page, 1972). Alternatively, a more                                                         3 See also Hix and Marsh (2007) for an application of protest voting in the context of the European Parliamentary elections. 
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radical form of exit from one’s preferred party is vote-switching: a voter 
chooses a different party from the one she has traditionally (or most recently) 
voted for.  
 
Finally, the concept of loyalty is crucial to understand electoral stability over 
time. Dowding et al (2000) conceptualizes loyalty as a value-based attachment 
to and identification with a group. In electoral terms, the importance of party-
identification was put forward as early as Campell et al’s path breaking work 
(1960) which has later become known as the Michigan-model4. Party 
identification serves as an important conceptual chain separating the 
preferences of an individual from her ultimate vote choice. In other words, for 
a party’s policy shift to change an individual’s party choice, it has to be large 
enough for the individual to be willing to pay the psychological “exit tax” 
(Dowding et al, 2000; Weber, 2011) that a changing party identification 
involves. 
 
Fiscal adjustment, the subject of this article, is a convenient example of a policy 
shift on a single issue space ranging from economic orthodoxy (right) to 
economic activism (left). Importantly, parties are perceived to be located on 
certain points on the issue-space before the policy shift. Parties that tend to 
constitute governments in OECD countries (see the empirical section for 
details) range from center-left to center-right on this policy space. Center-left 
parties include social-democratic and labour parties, whereas center-right 
parties belong to christian-democratic, liberal and conservative party families. 
Camia and Caravani (2012) have recently demonstrated that the latter three 
parties in Western party systems occupy very similar positions on the 
economic dimension, clearly separating them from their social democratic                                                         4 See also Clarke (1998) for a review on the conceptualization and the evolution of partisan identification over time. 
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counterparts. For the purposes of this article, it is therefore fruitful and 
convenient to consider them collectively as center-right. 
 
Beyond these mainstream choices, a number of party systems offer voters a 
choice to vote for more extreme alternatives. Extreme-left and green parties 
tend to occupy a position left of the mainstream governing alternatives 
whereas radical right parties often mix economic nationalism, welfare 
chauvinism and neo-liberal ideas in their rhetoric (Kriesi et al, 2006; Rennwald 
and Evans, 2014) making their left-right position on the economic domain 
harder to identify. What unites these parties, however, is a frequent display of 
economic populism (Zaslove, 2008) and extreme positions on a number of non-
economic issues, such as euroscepticism (Halikiopoulo et al, 2012), and the so-
called “new right” issues such as immigration (Kriesi et al, 2006). Moreover, 
most of these parties tend to be perennial opposition parties with little 
governing experience. 
 
To anticipate the electoral fate of different party types upon fiscal adjustment, 
it is crucial to keep in mind their relative position on the one-dimensional 
policy space. Figure 1 and Figure 2 offer such a stylized depiction of a one-
dimensional policy space lining up parties with preferences for less (left) to 
more (right) fiscal adjustment. For the initial discussion, it is helpful to simplify 
the analysis to two mainstream parties (left and right labelled “L” and “R” 
respectively) and one party with extreme-left fiscal preferences, labelled “EL”. 
Since most parties belonging to the extreme-left and green party families all 
satisfy this criterion and many of the radical right wing parties tend to be vocal 
critics of fiscal adjustment programs, this stylized illustration is a plausible 
reference point for the analysis to follow. I also assume that the electorates’ 
fiscal preferences are single-peaked and normally distributed: the electorate’s 
density distribution peaks at the middle of the policy-space. In other words, I 
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assume that most voters are centrist and only a relatively small subset of the 
electorate holds extreme preferences for extremely tight and loose fiscal 
policy5. 
 
Figure 1: Electoral consequences of fiscal adjustment by the center-left 
 
 
Figure 1 captures the electoral consequences of fiscal adjustment undertaken 
by the Left. Implementing a policy contrary to its (and its constituents’) fiscal 
preferences amounts to a relatively large right-ward shift on the policy space, 
indicated by a move towards L*. This has potentially important consequences 
for left-wing voters. On the one hand, the Left is vulnerable to losing support 
towards the left-end of its electoral coalition. Following the EVL framework 
laid out above, lacking effective voice strategies6 to implement policy change 
these voters could exit via abstention or via voting for a more extreme left-
wing alternative.                                                         5 By analyzing public attitudes on the preferred pace of debt consolidation, Stix (2013) and Hayo and Neumeir, (2013) report evidence consistent with this assumption from Austria and Germany, respectively. 6 Protest voting at second-order elections to voice discontent is not an available option when analyzing vote choice at parliamentary elections. 
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Figure 2: Electoral consequences of fiscal adjustment by the center-right  
 
 
However, a number of considerations suggest that mass exit will be limited. 
Most importantly, a large part of voters remain loyal despite the austerity 
shock because they find the “exit tax” discussed above prohibitively expensive. 
Those sufficiently alienated by the adjustment policy to desert the party will 
find voting for the extreme left alternative difficult. First, they may perceive 
these extremes to hold views on non-economic issues contrary to their own 
(the position taken on the post-material left-libertarian/right-authoritarian axis 
(Benoit and Laver, 2006; Inglehart, 1977; Kriesi et al, 2006) being a prominent 
example). Second, extreme parties’ lack of governing experience and 
mainstream parties’ regular efforts to portray them as lacking competence to 
manage the economy in challenging times may make voting for them 
unappealing. Third, in majoritarian electoral systems where strategic 
calculations are important, they may be reluctant to waste their votes on small 
and isolated parties without governing potential. Therefore, a number of forces 
indicated by the dashed arrows pointing leftwards will limit the electoral space 
that the left loses to its more extreme rivals. To the extent that electoral exit 
does occur, it will mostly manifest itself in electoral abstention, which results 
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in a considerably more limited dent in the left’s electoral strength than 
desertion to other parties would do. 
 
Moreover, electoral losses among its anti-austerity constituencies can be 
counterbalanced by new voters entering the left-wing coalition. Voters around 
the center of the issue-space, in particular, may find the left-wing party more 
appealing once they demonstrate the political resolve to implement economies 
policies that they perceive as “sound and responsible”. Some of these centrist 
voters may have been sympathetic to the left for non-economic reasons but 
may have found their economic position too left-wing. Once the left converges 
to the middle of the issue space by the fiscal adjustment, some of these centrist 
voters may therefore switch sides. Although such switching will also be 
limited by loyalty considerations on the right, the other sources of electoral 
stability discussed above will play no major role: by demonstrating its 
willingness to tighten the purse when necessary, the left can thus 
counterbalance its losses on the left by gains at the center. To the extent that 
the electorate’s density distribution is fundamentally centrist, such electoral 
gains could even result in net gains for the left-wing electoral coalition despite 
the losses they suffer on the margins. 
 
Turning to figure 2 depicting a fiscal adjustment undertaken by the right, the 
expected electoral consequences are fundamentally different. Since the right is 
perceived to have a greater attachment to economic orthodoxy than the left, 
the fiscal adjustment results in a smaller shift to the right on the economic 
issue-space. Crucially, however, this shift takes place away from the center of 
the space – indicated by the dashed arrow pointing right-wards – leaving an 
important segment of the centrist bloc up for grabs for the left. Again, although 
electoral exit will be limited by loyalty considerations, the reasoning provided 
before still holds: disaffected centrist voters willing to pay the “exit tax” now 
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have a convenient alternative to turn to: the mainstream-left with a less pro-
austerity agenda. Moreover, unlike the left capitalizing on its ability to sway 
voters at the center when implementing adjustment, the right is unable to 
mitigate its losses by searching for new voters at the right tail of the voter 
distribution. On the economic domain, mainstream right parties are unlikely to 
capture new voters, since it had few rivals with a more orthodox economic 
platform to begin with. In other words, fiscal adjustment undertaken by the 
right forces the party in the electoral corner of the economic issue-space 
leading to vote losses at the center. 
 
The right’s electoral difficulties are further compounded by the nature of many 
multi-party systems in the democratic world. Whereas the left shares the left 
space of the economic domain with rivals widely perceived to be 
inexperienced and extreme (see discussion above), the right side of the issue-
space is often divided up by multiple parties belonging to Christian 
democratic, liberal and conservative party families. Whenever at least one of 
these is in opposition during fiscal adjustment implemented by the right, 
disaffected voters have further alternatives to turn to at low exit costs. 
 
These abstract and general considerations are illustrated below by one of these 
multi-party systems in Europe: that of Denmark. Taking into account the fact 
that party politics is not uni-dimensional, I placed parties based on Chapel Hill 
expert surveys (Bakker et al, 2012; Hooghe et al, 2010; Steenbergen and Marks, 
2007)) on two salient dimensions: the economic domain under discussion (x-
axis) and the clash between the left-libertarian-right-authoritarian value 
systems (y-axis) consisting of such post-material issues as immigration, 
multiculturalism, gay rights, the environment etc. Party positions are 
numerical averages across 4 waves of surveys conducted in Denmark on the 
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respective dimensions. On both dimensions, lower scores correspond to more 
left-wing positions. 
 
Figure 3: The position of Danish political parties on a two-dimensional policy space 
 Source: Chapel Hill Surveys (average across the waves) 
 
The positions of the seven major Danish political parties illustrate reasonably 
well the preceding discussion. The Danish center-left represented by the Social 
Democrats (SD) has only one competitor on the economic-left: the Socialist 
People’s Party (SF). To the extent that vote losses to this left-wing competitor 
are contained by the considerations above, the SD, when in government, can 
implement austerity relatively safely by moving to the center of the issue space 
in the process. This policy, however, seems considerably riskier for the three 
center-right parties in Denmark: the Radical Liberals (RV), the Liberals (V) and 
the Conservative People’s Party (KF). By moving to the right, not only do they 
leave open the center of the policy-space to the center-left, they may also lose 
votes to their center-right rivals as well as to the Danish radical right - Danish 
People’s Party (DF) - due to their proximity either on the economic or the 
cultural dimension (or both). This tentative illustration on a single country 
thus suggests that fiscal adjustment undertaken by the right, contrary to much 
of the literature and a lot of popular commentary, is electorally riskier than 
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that undertaken by the left. The formal hypothesis that I will test in the 
empirical sections below can thus be formulated as follows: 
 
H: The center-left in government is electorally immune to austerity; the center-right, 
by contrast is electorally vulnerable to a significant amount of vote loss. 
 
 
Data and Measurement: Operationalizing Electoral 
Strength, Fiscal Adjustment and Partisanship 
 
Given the political micro-logic of fiscal adjustment laid out above, it would be 
theoretically appealing to rely on micro-level data to (dis)-confirm whether 
individuals with different fiscal preferences cast their vote according to our 
expectations. However, electoral survey data have a number of limitations. 
Most importantly, there are very few longitudinal surveys that are cross-
nationally comparable, making it all but impossible to cover the vast empirical 
arsenal of adjustment episodes across space and time. The widely used 
alternatives, cross-sectional surveys typically obtained from electoral study 
programs or cross-national research projects (International Social Survey 
Project, European Social Survey, Eurobarometer etc.), do not typically allow 
the researcher to trace the evolution of fiscal preferences of individuals beyond 
the actual point in time when the survey is taken. A partial exception is offered 
by the four modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 
project that include questions on previous vote choice of individuals. 
However, it is methodologically dubious to rely on self-reported vote choice; 
as argued above, vote-switching – our central point of theoretical interest – 
requires a quiet demanding cognitive process (the “exit tax”), possibly 
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introducing a lot of false reporting and systematic measurement error in the 
surveys. Finally, an empirical strategy linking fiscal adjustment to electoral 
behavior is severely limited when the survey dates are temporally far removed 
from fiscal adjustment episodes.  
 
For these reasons, I opted to conduct the empirical analysis on the aggregate 
level. If our theoretical expectations are to be confirmed empirically, the 
aggregated impact of individual-level vote switching and turnout decisions 
should show up in the changing electoral strength of political parties. Contrary 
to much of the economic voting literature that uses election outcomes (Hellwig 
and Samuels, 2007; Hodgson and Maloney, 2012; Powell and Whitten, 1993) as 
the dependent variable, I focused on the popularity aspect of the so-called 
Vote-Popularity Function (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). In line with studies 
that use vote intentions as opposed to actual vote shares as the dependent 
variable (Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 2011; Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck, 2011), this 
choice allowed me to trace the evolution of electoral strength in a continuous 
fashion at equal intervals, increasing the number of observations in the 
analysis. This is especially important when one is interested in the electoral 
impact of a political event which is temporally distributed in a non-random 
fashion vis a vis the electoral cycle. There are serious grounds to suspect, that 
in our case, this is a valid concern, as empirically verified by the political 
budget cycle literature (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Haan and Klomp, 2010; Shi and 
Svenson, 2003) on the one hand and related findings in the fiscal adjustment 
debate on the other (Alesina, 2006). To the extent that incumbents 
systematically undertake adjustment in the early phases of the electoral cycle, 
it is highly dubious to what extent electoral outcomes several years down the 
road pick up that effect.  
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The vote intention panel structures that my choice fell upon were thus 
constructed as follows. I collected polling data from publicly available sources 
and consulted polling agencies – see Table II in the Appendix for details - for 
additional material when necessary. Overall, I was able to build a vote-
intention dataset7 consisting of 96 political parties nested in 21 parliamentary 
democracies. I included parties only with sizeable support (2+ % of 
respondents) and constant parliamentary representation throughout the study 
period (1970-2013). The length of the series thus depended on data availability 
as well as on parties’ formation and entry to (or occasionally exit from in case 
of break-up, merger or dissolution) the respective party systems. The sample 
of countries provides sufficient variation in different important dimensions of 
party systems, such as the electoral formula, number of electorally relevant 
parties and the stability/volatility of the party system itself. In addition to 
consolidated parliamentary democracies, it also includes five relatively new 
democracies among the formerly communist countries of the European Union. 
Further details of the sample characteristics are in Table I in the Appendix. 
 
Although the vote intention indicator is typically measured on a monthly (in a 
few cases quarterly) basis, using annual units in the empirical analysis is 
preferable as fiscal adjustment is measured on an annual basis (see the 
discussion below). I thus took a numerical average of all the monthly/quarterly 
measures for a given year and used that as the dependent variable for the 
analysis. Moreover, to ward off concerns about selection bias identified by the 
literature (Alesina et al, 2011) emanating from the fact that strong/popular 
governments may be more likely to undertake adjustment, I used the first 
difference of the vote intention variable. In other words, the empirical models 
seek to predict the changes in the electoral strength of parties, rather than                                                         7 The only exception is France where the popularity measure indicates the percentage of respondents expressing a positive view on the political party. 
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electoral strength itself. Estimating changes are less likely to be tainted by 
selection bias as governments are unable to time fiscal adjustment according to 
the vote loss/gains these adjustments may entail. 
 
Operationalizing adjustment episodes, the main explanatory variable of the 
study, also poses a number of difficulties. Following Alesina et al’s (1998) 
landmark paper on the political economy of fiscal adjustment, a lively debate 
has ensued on the merits of the authors’ coding scheme. They define years of 
fiscal adjustment when the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by at 
least 1.5% of (potential) GDP (ibid, p.201). While admitting the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of this threshold, subsequent contributions to the debate 
defend this choice by highlighting the fact that it is high enough to exclude 
episodes that are not strictly speaking adjustment years (Alesina et al, 2011): 
“With the definition of a "large fiscal adjustment", and given that the deficit is 
cyclically adjusted, one tries to capture years in which fiscal policy was decisively 
contractionary with, most likely, active discretionary fiscal policies which were not 
business as usual or the result of the cycle” (p.5) 
 
The most prominent criticism of this measurement strategy can be traced to the 
seminal contribution of Devries et al (2011) who argue that cyclical adjustment 
is a highly imperfect measure that fails to take into account such windfall 
revenues as property taxes during a housing boom. Therefore, the authors 
propose to shift the focus from fiscal outcomes to the underlying policy change 
(budgetary acts) to define adjustment episodes. Despite the merits of their 
argument, I am uneasy about using their dataset for the purposes of this 
article. First, the adjustment years that the authors focus on pay little attention 
to implementation; it is not all that clear whether adjustment budgets voted 
upon in parliament actually resulted in the intended fiscal changes. Second, 
their dataset is limited both temporally and geographically, significantly 
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reducing our empirical leverage (by the exclusion of Eastern European 
countries for instance). Third, to the extent that those windfall revenues that 
the authors identify are positively correlated with the business cycle (Barrios 
and Rizza, 2010 p. 11), cyclical adjustment at least partly corrects for the 
temporary nature of those revenue items. For these reasons, this article follows 
the outcome-based approach and uses the 1.5% benchmark as the starting 
point. In our robustness checks, acknowledging the arbitrary nature of the 
threshold, we modify the threshold in two directions to see if the results are 
robust to a broader/stricter definition of adjustment years.  
 
Regarding the conditioning impact of partisanship to measure the impact of 
austerity on popularity, we follow a two-pronged approach to identify the 
partisan standing of political parties on the economic left-right domain. The 
conventional approach, as typically used in welfare-state studies follows from 
the logic of the power-resource theory (Korpi, 1983; 2006, Huber and Stephens, 
2001), according to which party families reflect long-standing ideologies and 
allegience to different socioeconomic groups that largely determine the 
macroeconomic policies that different parties pursue when in government 
(Hibbs, 1977; Cusack, 2001). In this vein, our first variable identifies (center)-
left parties that belong to the Social-Democratic party family and (center)-right 
parties that belong to Christian-Democratic, Conservative and Liberal party 
families8. Parties belonging to agrarian, green, extreme-right, extreme-left and 
other (e.g. regional or ethnic parties) were coded separately. 
 
Recognizing the heterogeneity of parties’ platform and their constituencies’ 
composition within the same party family, I used an alternative variable of a 
continuous form to place parties on the left-right domain. To do so, I relied on                                                         8 To classify parties, I relied on the party family variable in the Comparative Manifesto Project, cross-validated by parties’ membership in international political organisations, such as parliamentary groups in the European Parliament and Internationals.  
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the most extensive cross-national expert series projects that place parties on a 
left-right scale in a number of dimensions. For EU member states, I relied on 
Chapel Hill surveys (Bakker et al, 2012) and used the average left-right score 
across all waves of the survey series as my partisan variable. For non-EU 
democracies (Australia, Canada, Iceland and Norway in my sample) where 
Chapell Hill scores are not available I relied on Benoit and Laver’s (2006) 
expert survey and used the tax-spending variable as the best proxy for the 
partisan variable of interest. In both surveys, parties are assigned scores 
between 0 and 10 with higher scores indicating a more right-wing position. We 
prefer using these expert surveys to the most commonly used alternative, the 
Comparative Manifesto Dataset because our theoretical considerations rely on 
the cumulative perception of parties’ economic ideology in voters’ minds over 
many years or even decades. We expect a sufficiently large number of country-
experts to provide a more accurate picture of this perception than a numerical 
measure of policy emphasis on a single written document at any given 
election9. 
 
Finally, it is important to control for a number of variables which may correlate 
with our key independent variables of interest possibly biasing the estimates. 
First, in the footsteps of the economic voting literature, I control for GDP 
growth, unemployment rate (both changes and levels) and inflation (both changes 
and levels) to filter out the electoral effect of adjustment which occurs through 
its immediate economic impact. While GDP growth is theoretically speaking a 
change variable itself, it is a priori less clear whether voters prioritize changes 
or levels of unemployment and inflation when attributing responsibility. For 
these two variables, therefore, I follow a “let the data speak” approach and 
include both levels and changes in the models.                                                         9 The reliability of CMP estimates has been subject to a long-standing debate and various criticisms (see Budge and Bara, 2001 for a critical review). 
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Furthermore, I use a set of dummy variables to model the evolution of 
popularity over the electoral cycle (election year, post-election year, pre-election 
year with the remaining “mid-cycle years” as the reference category) to allow 
for the possibility that different partisan governments time their adjustment 
policies in a different manner. Finally, I introduce an additive index capturing 
institutional and political constraints (bicameralism, federalism and coalition 
government) that governing parties are under to capture varying levels of 
clarity of responsibility for policy outcomes (Powell and Whitten, 1993; 
Whitten and Palmer, 1999). 
 
 
Estimation, model-set up and results 
 
Equipped with all the necessary variables to investigate the electoral impact of 
fiscal adjustment, I set up a cross-section time-series model of the following 
general form. 
 
                        ΔVIpt = β0 + βi (A*P*G) + βj (C*P*G) + αp + μt + εpt 
 
Where ΔVIpt  is the annual change in the vote intention share of party p at time 
t, β0  is a regression intercept, βi is a vector of coefficients that estimate the 
interaction effect between the fiscal adjustment dummy (A), the partisanship 
variable(s) (P) and the government status dummy (G)10 as well as its 
constituent terms,  βj is a vector of coefficients estimating the interaction effect 
between the partisanship variable(s) (P), the government status dummy (G)                                                         10 For the government status dummy, parties were coded 1 when they were in power at the 
beginning of the calendar year. For years of government change, any coding scheme is admittedly problematic; my coding decision is motivated by the consideration that annual budgets are prepared in the year before hence the parties at the power during the preparation face are likely to be held at least partly responsible. 
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and a set of control variables (C) as well as its constituent terms, αp + μt are p-1 
and t-1 party, and time-dummies, respectively and ε is the error term. 
 
Because the data structure (temporally sequential observations clustered in 
parties that are in turn clustered in countries) is likely to violate the i.i.d. 
(independent and identically distributed) assumption of the errors, pooled 
OLS regressions are likely to introduce bias in the estimates and/or in their 
standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995; Kittel and Winner, 2005). Serial 
correlation, a common concern in time-series cross-section designs is a 
relatively minor problem for us because of the first-difference specification of 
the dependent variable. There is no theoretical reason to expect changes in 
popularity in yeart to be systematically correlated with the change in yeart+1; in 
fact the correlation coefficient between the dependent variable and its first lag 
is only 0.11 in the sample. Panel heteroskedasticity (error variances differing 
across the units) and cross-sectional dependence, on the other hand, are more 
serious concerns. It is important to recall that in our data structure, party-
years, rather than country-years are the units of analysis. Parties of different 
sizes are likely to exhibit different variation in electoral strength around their 
mean and we are unable to explicitly model all the sources of this variation. As 
a result, the variance of the errors is likely to systematically differ between 
parties, violating the homoscedastic error assumption. Moreover, since vote 
intention is measured in % of total respondents with a party preference, 
electoral support for parties in the same country are likely to correlate 
negatively with each other. If one party’s support drops for reasons 
unaccounted for in the models, it automatically translates into higher support 
for the other parties even if the absolute electoral strength of the latter 
party(ies) remains constant. For this reason, the party-specific errors within the 
same country are likely to violate the cross-sectional independence 
assumption. A series of statistical tests – results available in the regression 
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output tables below – confirmed these expectations: the variance-covariance 
matrix of the errors violates a number of the i.i.d. assumptions. I thus 
proceeded to follow the “Beck and Katz standard” (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 
2001) and ran OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors and 
(party-specific) fixed-effects11. The inclusion of the latter takes care of the 
possible correlation between the main independent variables of interest and 
party-specific error terms, causing omitted variable bias in the estimates. 
 
The first sets of empirical models – results shown in Table 1 below – are 
presented as follows. First (column 1), I set up a baseline economic voting 
model where the change of vote intentions is regressed on the standard 
economic variables (gdp growth, levels and changes in unemployment and 
inflation) and their interaction with a government status dummy. Second, 
(column 2) adds the fiscal adjustment dummy as a fourth regressor, again 
interacted with the government status dummy to investigate unconditional 
effects of fiscal adjustment on governing party popularity. The third model 
(column 3) adds the additional controls (electoral timetable and the index on 
government constraints) in interaction with government status. From the 
regression output, I suppress the party-specific fixed effects to keep the output 
table at a manageable length. 
 
Table I: Regression output table for the baseline specifications  Δvoteint Δvoteint Δvoteint Growth -0.034 -0.029 -0.032  (0.70) (0.60) (0.70) Government -0.987 -0.929 -1.563  (2.05)** (1.96)* (2.61)*** government*growth 0.116 0.109 0.073  (1.08) (1.02) (0.72) unemployment 0.042 0.039 0.038  (1.32) (1.22) (1.19)                                                         11 Lacking a theoretical reason for common shocks to affect popularity changes across the board, I did not include year fixed-effects in the models; introducing year dummies, however, do not change the substantive nature of the results. 
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government*unemployment -0.138 -0.129 -0.105  (3.04)*** (2.82)*** (2.34)** 
Δunemployment 0.061 0.065 0.059  (0.52) (0.55) (0.51) 
government* Δunemployment -0.745 -0.754 -0.827  (3.09)*** (3.17)*** (3.57)*** inflation 0.014 0.019 0.030  (0.42) (0.56) (0.88) government*inflation -0.003 -0.002 -0.023  (0.04) (0.03) (0.39) 
Δinflation -0.014 -0.008 -0.009  (0.29) (0.16) (0.19) 
government*Δinflation -0.212 -0.217 -0.210  (2.28)** (2.34)** (2.33)** adjustment  0.099 0.136   (0.37) (0.51) government*adjustment  -0.759 -0.696   (1.41) (1.27) election   -0.441    (1.80)* government*election   1.713    (3.67)*** pre-election   -0.218    (0.98) government*pre-election   0.883    (1.96)* post-election   -0.144    (0.60) government*post-election   0.319    (0.72) constraints   0.282    (1.30) government*constraints   -0.082    (0.34) 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 
P-value for Modified Wald test χ2 for panel  
heteroskedasticity 
P-value for Pesaran CD-statistic for cross-
sectional independence 
N 
  <0.000      0.11 2,442    
 <0.000     0.12  2,379   
 <0.000      0.08 2,293 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2 builds on this last, fully specified model and adds the partisan 
variables. The first two partisan models (columns 4 and 5) introduce two 
dummy variables for center-left and center-right governments, respectively. 
The final model (column 6) captures partisanship on a 0-10 scale from the 
expert surveys discussed earlier and uses this continuous variable in 
interaction with the other explanatory variables (government status and 
adjustment dummy) to probe the conditioning effect of partisanship on fiscal 
Abel Bojar 
27  
adjustment’s electoral impact. From Table 2, due its extended length as a result 
of the three-way interactions, I also suppress the control variables (electoral 
timetable dummies and constraints) and their interactions in addition to the 
party-specific fixed effects. Moreover, to further ease interpretation of these 
interactive models, I follow Brambor et al (2006) and present marginal effects 
plots for the fiscal adjustment dummy for different combinations of 
government status and partisanship. This is especially crucial to interpret the 
three-way interactions from Table 2. 
 
Table II: Regression output table for the fully-specified 3-way interaction models 
for alternative (center-left dummy, center-right dummy, left-right score) measures 
of partisanship  Δvoteint Δvoteint Δvoteint     adjustment -0.038 -0.099 0.162  (0.16) (0.32) (0.42) government -2.147 -1.460 0.471  (3.15)*** (1.55) (0.27) adjustment*government -1.094 0.403 1.180  (2.24)** (0.58) (0.89) centerleft 2.750    (1.01)   adjustment*centerleft 0.406    (0.55)   government*centerleft 1.022    (0.65)   adjustment*government*centerleft 1.585    (1.36)   growth -0.058 0.072 0.161  (1.25) (1.18) (1.42) government*growth 0.103 -0.070 -0.188  (1.01) (0.46) (0.65) centerleft*growth 0.191    (1.15)   government*centerleft*growth -0.116    (0.44)   unemployment 0.069 -0.019 -0.017  (1.94)* (0.28) (0.13) government*unemployment -0.074 -0.109 -0.348  (1.28) (1.46) (2.25)** centerleft*unemployment -0.036    (0.31)   government*centerleft*unemployment -0.170    (1.33)    Δunemployment -0.053 0.236 0.294  (0.47) (1.42) (1.07) 
government* Δunemployment -0.663 -1.237 -1.343  (2.62)*** (3.51)*** (1.84)* 
centerleft* Δunemployment 0.527   
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 (1.46)   government*centerleft* Δunemployment -0.692    (1.14)   inflation 0.038 -0.009 -0.011  (1.08) (0.21) (0.18) government*inflation -0.052 0.013 -0.123  (0.83) (0.15) (0.91) centerleft*inflation -0.033    (0.29)   government*centerleft*inflation 0.084    (0.62)    Δinflation -0.019 0.049 0.140  (0.34) (0.79) (1.41) 
government* Δinflation -0.269 -0.097 -0.167  (2.75)*** (0.71) (0.65) 
centerleft*Δinflation 0.082    (0.50)   
government*centerleft*Δinflation 0.067    (0.29)    centerright   -2.273    (1.33)  adjustment*centerright   0.214 (0.46) government*centerright  -0.374    (0.29)  adjustment*government*centerright  -1.814    (2.08)**  centerright*growth  -0.201    (2.06)**  government*centerright*growth  0.251    (1.37)  centerright*unemployment  0.131    (1.42)  government*centerright*unemployment  -0.033    (0.34)  
centerright* Δunemployment  -0.300    (1.17)  
government*centerright* Δunemployment  0.620    (1.35)  centerright*inflation  0.064    (1.01)  government*centerright*inflation  -0.051    (0.52)  
centerright* Δinflation  -0.115    (1.14)  
government*centerright* Δinflation  -0.260    (1.51)  leftright   -2.111    (0.29) adjustment*leftright   -0.029    (0.36) government*leftright   -0.397    (1.25) adjustment*government*leftright   -0.331    (1.42) growth*leftright   -0.038    (1.82)* government*growth*leftright   0.050 
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   (1.04) unemployment*leftright   0.014    (0.65) government*unemployment*leftright   0.039    (1.41)  Δunemployment*leftright   -0.043    (0.87) 
government* Δunemployment*leftright   0.085    (0.69) inflation*leftright   0.008    (0.68) government*inflation*leftright   0.019    (0.83)  Δinflation*leftright   -0.030    (1.44) 
government* Δinflation*leftright   -0.015    (0.34) 
R2 0.13 0.12 0.12 
P-value for Modified Wald test χ2 for panel 
heteroskedasticity 
P-value for Pesaran CD-statistic for cross-
sectional independence 
N 
<0.000 0.11   2,141     
<0.000 0.11       2,141       
<0.000 0.13      2,141      * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The calculated marginal effects from Table 1 reveal a relatively simple story. 
While the state of the economy clearly carries electoral risks for incumbents – 
government parties are punished for high levels of unemployment, rising 
unemployment and rising inflation – there is no comparable evidence found 
for fiscal consolidation episodes: although the estimated impact of an 
adjustment year on popularity change is negative (-0.59%), it doesn’t reach 
statistical significance at the 5% level. Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of 
growth rates when controlling for the unemployment and inflation variables 
also stops short of statistical significance. The estimated marginal effects and 
95% confidence intervals are shown below on Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Marginal effects plots with point estimates and 95% confidence intervals 
from the fully specified economic voting model 
  
  
 
When turning to the main results from the partisanship models, calculating 
marginal effects becomes somewhat more complicated. Now the marginal 
effect of an adjustment year is both a function of government status and 
partisanship. Figure 5 shows the calculated effects as a function of these 
variables, shown separately for the center-left dummy, the center-right 
dummy  and the continuous partisanship measure obtained from the expert 
surveys. All three plots reveal the same pattern: for center-right parties 
presiding over austerity, the average annual impact on their popularity is 
around -1%, conveniently reaching statistical significance at conventional 
levels. For the center-left, on the other hand, no such punishment effect is 
found and the sign of the estimated marginal effect is positive (albeit non-
significant). This pattern remains the same when partisanship is measured on 
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the continuous scale: for parties that are scored 6 or higher by the country 
experts (0 being extreme left, 10 being extreme right), there is a clearly 
discernible punishment effect when these parties are in power during fiscal 
adjustment. For parties scored below that point, again, no statistically 
significant effect is found and the point estimate turns positive at 3 or below on 
the 10-point left-right scale. These results provide corroborative evidence for 
the main argument of this article. 
 
Figure 5: Marginal effects plots with point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals  
for the partisan models of fiscal adjustment 
  
 
 
The next step in the analysis is making sense of the substantive impact of fiscal 
adjustment under different partisan governments. Two important 
considerations complicate a quick assessment of this substantive impact. First, 
the interactive specifications, as shown above, imply different marginal effects 
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of fiscal adjustment at different levels (values) of partisanship. Second, the 
economic control variables (growth, unemployment and inflation) are likely to 
respond to fiscal adjustment hence a “ceteris paribus” assessment of the 
substantive impact of the latter makes little theoretical sense. The following 
hypothetical comparison thus assumes a scenario where different partisan 
governments engage in fiscal adjustment at the (sample) average level of 
macroeconomic conditions (inflation, unemployment and growth) in an 
electorally tranquil period (ie. middle of an electoral cycle) with average levels 
of government constraints (1.5). However, in response to this fiscal adjustment, 
growth is likely to drop in the short-run via its standard Keynesian channels 
(Monastiriotis, 2014) with a concomitant rise in unemployment (Okun’s Law) 
and falling inflation as lower aggregate demand and higher spare capacity in 
the economy ease price pressures.  
 
Since the vast empirical literature on fiscal multipliers and output gaps lies 
beyond the purpose of this article, this hypothetical scenario will be repeated 
for different assumptions on the response of growth, unemployment and 
inflation to fiscal adjustment relying on the empirical distribution of the 
relevant variables. In particular, I will compare three scenarios: 1) no response 
of macro-variables to fiscal adjustment, 2) moderate response whereby growth 
and inflation falls to the 25th percentile and unemployment rises to the 75th 
percentile in the empirical distribution of the variables in the sample and 3) 
strong response where growth and inflation fall to the 10th percentile whereas 
unemployment rises to the 90th percentile. While these thresholds are 
admittedly arbitrary, they merely serve as an illustration on how different 
parties’ popularity evolves during years of fiscal adjustment and its possible 
recessionary consequences. The simulated response based on the model 
estimates are shown below on Figure 6: 
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Figure 6: Simulated changes of government parties’ popularity in fiscal adjustment 
years under different macro-scenarios Scenario 1                                                     Scenario 2                                                   
 
 
               Scenario 3 
 
 
The first simulation (left panel), assuming a “ceteris paribus” scenario, confirm 
the previous findings. For left-wing governments, the expected loss of 
popularity is moderate, around 1% of respondents and for the left end of the 
spectrum, statistically indistinguishable from 0. As one moves to the right on 
the left-right scale, the predicted loss increases in years of fiscal adjustment, 
reaching 2% around a left-right score of 6 and approaching 3% towards the 
right end of the scale. In the second simulated scenario (middle panel), growth 
slows to 1.3% from the sample average of 2.5%, unemployment rises by 0.58% 
to a level of 8.5%, while inflation drops by 1.3% to an average annual rate of 
price increase of 2.1%. The qualitative pattern still holds: though all 
government parties’ popularity ratings take a hit, the impact of fiscal 
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adjustment compounded by its assumed effect on the economy impacts on 
right-wing parties more than on left-wing ones. Under the final scenario (right-
panel), when fiscal adjustment takes a heavy toll on the economy (now the 
economy shrinks by -0.49%, unemployment increases by 1.37% to a level of 
11.35% and inflation is reduced by 3.13% to a 1.2% annual rate), the previous 
patterns disappear and even slightly reverse. Compounded by its heavy 
recessionary impact, fiscal adjustment now entails heavy electoral losses for all 
political parties, ranging between 2.5 and 3% of respondents. To sum up, 
therefore, while the partial impact of fiscal adjustment on popularity has been 
shown to affect center-right parties only, all parties lose popularity in 
adjustment years when/if these periods are marked by recession, high and 
rapidly rising unemployment as well as falling inflation. 
 
 
Robustness checks 
 
There are two broad lines of possible objections that I seek to address in this 
penultimate section. First, the heterogenous country sample of the empirical 
analysis raises the possibility that “center-left” and “center-right” may mean 
very different kinds of parties in different party systems. Same goes for the 
continuous measure of partisanship; country experts from different political 
systems may have very different scoring criteria when placing parties on the 
left-right scale. This is a particular concern for post-communist democracies 
where the left-right cleavage tends to be more dominant in issues relating to 
the role of nationhood, minorities, religion, traditional values and more 
generally speaking, in issues rooted in different conceptualization of public 
morality (Kitchelt, 1992; Vachudova, 2008; Rovny, 2014). The second possible 
objection relates to measurement problems. Admittedly, the 1.5% of potential 
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GDP threshold is arbitrary when identifying years of fiscal adjustment. It is 
therefore important to analyze the stability of the results when different 
thresholds are used. Also, the analysis focused on government status, 
implicitly assuming that all government parties share equal responsibility for 
economic outcomes when facing the electoral verdict. This assumption, 
however, sits uneasily with the clarity of responsibility thesis (Powell and 
Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999) in economic voting that posits that 
voters, on the aggregate, are very much capable of distinguishing between 
clear and blurred responsibility contexts. Although my additive control 
variable of government constraints partially addressed this issue, collapsing all 
government parties in the same dummy variable (government status) is still a 
potential concern. 
 
To address these objections, I implemented three rounds of robustness checks 
in the analysis. First, I restricted the sample to “old” democracies to make sure 
that the results are not (partly) driven by the idiosyncratic politics of post-
communism. Secondly, I modified the threshold of the fiscal adjustment 
dummy to 1.25% and 1.75% of GDP to address “type 1” (excluding fiscal 
adjustments when they should be included) and  “type 2” (including fiscal 
adjustments when they should be excluded) errors. Thirdly, I replaced the 
government status dummy with a leading party dummy so that for coalition 
governments, only the largest party that delegates the prime minister is coded 
as the government party. This new coding scheme estimates the impact of 
fiscal adjustment only on one party for each country-year. The marginal effects 
plots for these robustness checks are shown on Figure 7 below, taking the left-
right continuous measure as the partisan variable. 
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Figure 7: Robustness checks. Marginal effects plots with point estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals for old democracies, alternative fiscal adjustment thresholds 
and leading government parties 
  
  
 
The upper-left panel in Figure 7 shows the results after taking the post-
communist “new” democracies out of the sample. The overall pattern remains 
the same: positive and non-significant point estimates for center-left 
governments and statistically significant electoral punishment for center-right 
parties. The only slight difference is the somewhat smaller substantive impact 
of fiscal adjustment on center-right governing parties’ popularity ratings 
compared to the larger sample. Moving on to the upper-right panel where the 
government status dummy is replaced with the leading party dummy, the 
same pattern holds with an even steeper slope. Confirming the clarity of 
responsibility thesis, when restricting the analysis to the largest governing 
party, the conditioning impact of partisanship increases: the marginal impact 
of fiscal adjustment for parties on the right end of the Left-Right scale 
surpasses 3% of respondents. Finally, varying the threshold for the 
identification of fiscal adjustment episodes, our previous results become 
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somewhat weaker: while the overall pattern (negative slope for the point 
estimates as a function of partisanship) remains, under the alternative 
thresholds, almost all point estimates are now statistically indistinguishable 
from 0.  
 
One possible interpretation runs as follows. For the lower threshold (bottom-
left panel), the fiscal adjustment variable now includes a large number of years 
where fiscal tightening might have resulted from circumstances other than 
deliberate policy design (Devries et al, 2011), weakening the reliability of the 
adjustment measure. For the higher threshold (bottom-right panel), we may be 
encountering the opposite problem: though putting the threshold high ensures 
that only real adjustment years fall under our measure, the low number of 
positive observations (i.e. adjustment years)  increases the standard errors of 
the estimates, making statistical inference difficult. This interpretation is 
consistent with the fact that the slope of the marginal effects plot is very 
similar to the one under the baseline specification with considerably wider 
confidence intervals, however. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The negative relationship between fiscal adjustment and incumbents’ 
popularity is arguably as close as it gets to a conventional wisdom in political 
science. Either via its Keynesian effects on the macro-economy or via the 
concentrated losses it entails for important voting blocs with only uncertain, 
disperse and temporally distant payoffs in the future, fiscal adjustment is 
widely presumed to result in electoral losses for government parties executing 
them. The problem with many conventional wisdoms of course is that they are 
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insufficiently subjected to proper empirical scrutiny and critical theorization. 
This one is no exception. 
 
This article sought to bridge this gap by building on the Hirschmanian 
framework of exit, voice and loyalty (EVL). I posited that the degree to which 
the electorate punishes incumbent governments crucially depends on the 
available partisan alternatives. If these alternatives are perceived to lie further 
to the right on the policy dimension of economic orthodoxy, disaffected voters 
have little reasons to switch their votes in their favour. If alternatives are seen 
as too extreme on other salient political dimensions or lacking governing 
experience and competence to shield the electorate from the burdens of 
adjustment, they are equally unlikely to sway a decisive share of disaffected 
voters. Conversely, when there are available partisan alternatives as more 
credible defenders of existing government programs, the electoral threat is 
considerably greater. Combining these considerations led to a simple 
hypothesis that this article set out to test: the center-left is in an electorally 
superior position to implement fiscal adjustment compared to the center-right. 
 
Building on a novel and largest dataset to date on close to 100 parties’ 
popularity ratings from 21 democracies, this hypothesis has been largely 
confirmed by the data. The partial effect of fiscal adjustment on vote intention 
shares on ruling parties is negative and significant only when the parties in 
question belong to center-right party families or they are scored right-of-center 
by country experts. Unless the immediate effects of fiscal adjustment on 
growth, unemployment and inflation are extreme, governing center-right 
parties consistently lose more support in years of fiscal adjustment than their 
center-left counterparts. This pattern has been shown to hold under an 
alternative country sample restricted to old democracies, a more restrictive 
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coding of governing parties and alternative measurement thresholds for 
identifying adjustment years. 
 
A concluding thought that arises from these results is their implication for 
partisan politics. If the center-left can consistently get away with fiscal 
adjustment without ever being punished for it, it should be only a matter of 
time before the very notion of the political left hollows out, ending partisan 
politics as we knew it in line with the “new politics of the welfare state” thesis 
(Pierson, 1996). Alternatively, it is only a matter of time before new policy 
entrepreneurs fill the policy space left wide open by the center-left. Thus far, 
the only limited electoral success of these more extreme contenders has been 
testimony to the relative resilience of the center, limiting a mass exodus of 
formerly center-left voters to the far-left as my theory predicted. How long can 
the center hold in the post-crisis context of austerity politics may yet turn out 
to be one of the main electoral stories of our times.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1: Political parties in the sample 
 
Country      Parties                                          Timeframe                      Party family 
Australia Australian Labour Party 1994-2003 Center-left 
 Liberal+National coalition 1994-2003 Center-right 
 Green Party 1994-2003 Green 
Austria Austrian People’s Party 2001-2013 Center-right 
 Social Democratic Party 2001-2013 Center-left 
 Freedom Party 2001-2013 Extreme-right 
 Greens 2001-2013 Green 
Canada Liberal Party 1980-2013 (2002-2003 missing) Center-right 
 Conservative Party/Progressive Conservative Party 1980-2013 (2003;2003 missing) Center-right 
 New Democratic Party 1980-2013 (2003;2003 missing) Center-left 
 Bloc Quebecois 1991-2013 (2002-2006 missing) Other 
Czech Republic Civic Democratic Party 1996-2013 Center-right 
 Social Democratic Party 1996-2013 Center-left 
 Communist Party 1996-2013 Extreme-left 
Denmark Social Democratic Party 1971-2013 Center-left 
 Conservative People’s Party 1971-2013 Center-right 
 Socialist People’s Party 1971-2013 Center-left 
 Danish People’s Party 1996-2013 Extreme-right 
 Liberal Party 1971-2013 Center-right 
 Radical Liberal Party 1971-2013 Center-right 
Finland Social Democratic Party 1995-2013 Center-left 
 Left Alliance 1995-2013 Extreme-left 
 National Coalition Party 1995-2013 Center-right 
 Centre Party 1995-2013 Center-right 
 Green League 1995-2013 Green 
 Swedish People’s Party 1995-2013 Other 
 Christian Democratic Party 1995-2013 Center-right 
 True Finns 1997-2013 Extreme-right 
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France Socialist Party 1976-2013 Center-left 
 Rally for the Republic/Union for a Popular Movement 1979-2013 Center-right 
 National Front 1985-2013 Extreme-right 
 Communist Party 1976-2013 Extreme-left 
 Greens 1993-2013 Green 
Germany Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union 1978-2013 Center-right 
 Social Democratic Party 1978-2013 Center-left 
 Greens 1981-2013 Green 
 Free Democratic Party 1978-2013 Center-right 
 Party of Democratic Socialism/ Left Party 1992-2013 Extreme-left 
Hungary Alliance of Young Democrats 1995-2013 Center-right 
 Socialist Party 1995-2013 Center-left 
Iceland Progressive Party 1995-2013 Center-right 
 Independence Party 1995-2013 Center-right 
 Social Democratic Alliance 2000-2013 Center-left 
 Left-Green Movement 1999-2013 Green 
Ireland Fianna Fail 1986-2013 Center-right 
 Fine Gael 1986-2013 Center-right 
 Labour Party 1986-2013 Center-left 
Italy Democratic Party 2002-2013 Center-left 
 Forza Italia 2002-2013 Center-right 
 Nothern League 2002-2013 Extreme-right 
Netherlands Labour Party 1971-2013 Center-left 
 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy 1971-2013 Center-right 
 Christian Democratic Appeal 1977-2013 Center-right 
 Green League 1990-2013 (2001-2002 missing) Green 
 D66 1971-2013 Center-right 
 Party of Freedom 2005-2013 Extreme-right 
 Socialist Party 2003-2013 Extreme-left 
Norway Labour Party 1975-2013 Center-left 
 Progress Party 1975-2013 Extreme-right 
 Conservative Party 1975-2013 Center-right 
 Christian Democratic Party 1975-2013 Center-right 
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 Center Party 1975-2013 Other 
 Socialist Left Party 1975-2013 Extreme-left 
 Liberal Party 1981-2013 Center-right 
Poland Democratic Left Alliance 1996-2013 Center-left 
 Civic Platform 2002-2013 Center-right 
 Law and Justice 2002-2013 Center-right 
 Peasant Party 1996-2013 Other 
Portugal Socialist Party 1987-2013 Center-left 
 Social Democratic Party 1987-2013 Center-right 
 People’s Party 1987-2013 Center-right 
 United Democratic Coalition 1987-2013 Extreme-left 
Slovakia Movement for Democratic Slovakia 1999-2013 Other 
 Democratic and Christian Union 1999-2013 Center-right 
 Party of Hungarian Coalition 1999-2013 Other 
 National Party 1999-2013 Extreme-right 
 Direction 2001-2013 Center-left 
 Christian Democratic Movement 2002-2013 Center-right 
Slovenia Liberal Democratic Party 2000-2013 Center-right 
 Democratic Party 2000-2013 Center-right 
 People’s Party 2000-2013 Center-right 
 Social Democratic Party 2000-2013 Center-left 
 National Party 2000-2010 Extreme-right 
 Desus 2000-2013 Other 
Spain People’s Party 1987-2013 Center-right 
 Socialist Workers’ Party 1985-2013 Center-left 
Sweden Social Democratic Party 1971-2013 Center-left 
 Left Party 1971-2013 Extreme-left 
 Green Party 1982-2013 Green 
 Moderate Party 1971-2013 Center-right 
 Liberal Party 1971-2013 Center-right 
 Christian Democratic Party 1986-2013 Center-right 
 Center Party 1971-2013 Center-right 
UK Conservative Party 1979-2013 Center-right 
 Labour Party 1979-2013 Center-left 
 Liberal Democratic Party 1979-2013 Center-right 
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Table A-2 : Sources of polling data  
                                 Country                   Polling Firms 
Austria OGM, Gallup 
Australia RoyMorgan 
Canada Environics, Nanoresearch, Ipsos Reid 
Czech Republic CVVM 
Denmark Gallup 
Finland Taloustutkimus 
France TNS-Sofres 
Germany Forschungsgruppe 
Hungary Ipsos 
Iceland Capacent 
Ireland Ipsos, RedC 
Italy Ipsos 
Netherlands NIPO, Peil, Ipsos 
Norway TNS-Gallup 
Poland CBOS, TNS 
Portugal Euroexpansao, Eurosondagem, Marktest 
Slovakia FocusResearch 
Slovenia Ninamedia 
Spain CIS 
Sweden  Demoskop 
UK Ipsos-Mori   
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